European security and defence policy (ESDP) may be justifiably called one of the major international political sensations at the boundary of the 20th and 21st centuries. In the life of the European Union the ESDP stands as a landmark along with Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the Euro as well as with preparations for the most sizeable enlargement and radical structural re-organisation in its history. The tragedy of 11 September 2001-terrorist attacks against the US-showed once more how important Europe's endeavours in the fields of security and defence are.

The start of these European efforts was rather dramatic. One may precisely point to the place, time and major actors. The place: a quaint French port and resort, Saint-Malo, a kind of vestibule to the world-famous historical Mont-St-Michel. The time: 4-5 December 1998. The actors: Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair. The result: a declaration on European defence, in fact an appeal for creating the European security and defence policy.

The declaration stated unequivocally that the European Council should “decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy” and that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by a credible military force.” This appeal laid the foundation for a series of radical actions by the EU that opened a completely new page in its history. The ESDP occupied a permanent place in deliberations and decisions of almost all EU summits (European Councils), thus sharply and radically abrogating the multi-year neglect of these problems.

Past

The phenomenal success of European economic integration has overshadowed the founders' motive to move economic integration towards political and defence integration of Western Europe. The builders of Greater Europe had barely signed the first treaty in Paris in 1951, which started the process of European integration (the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community), when they rushed to construct a political, security and defence organisation.

The ado over the emerging “European Army” overwhelmed not only Europe. It was praised by supporters, sceptically watched by Americans (preoccupied with hastily creating NATO) and fiercely abused by Soviet propaganda as yet another “imperialist plot.” In little more than a year after the first Paris Treaty, the new Treaty on European Defence Community (EDC) was signed in Paris on 27 May 1952 by the same six original members of the community. The Treaty's scope was rather enormous.

The European Defence Community was coupled with a plan to create a European Political Community (EPC), the fundamental features of which were quickly drafted. Together they constituted the project that practically stopped on the threshold of a not-so-vague European confederation. The EDC and EPC envisaged a system of decision-making organs: the European Executive Council with far-reaching executive powers; the Council of national ministers; the nine-member Commission; the parliamentary assembly (and later, the two-chamber Parliament) with legislative rights far outstretching the powers of the present European Parliament; and the Court of Justice with strong judicial powers.

The European army was envisaged as a formidable fighting force of forty divisions: 14 French, 12 German, 11 Italian and 3 from the Benelux countries. They had to have one uniform and one flag. Joint training and procurement had to be introduced. In a word it seemed that the ship of the integrated Europe boldly sailed into the sea of world politics and defence, pushing the economic foundation of the community to the background.

In a sense, the European Defence Community and the European Political Community of the early 1950s (as they were contemplated) were more solid organisations than the structures which the European Union is constructing nowadays.

Historical parallels are deceiving, this being no exception. Still, when thinking of objective and subjective factors that pushed Europeans to create the machinery of common defence in the mid-20th and early 21st centuries, in both internal and external conditions, one can see similarities and differences, at least in some major aspects.

There lie many similarities to American approaches. Then as well as now, the key element of Washington's deliberations has been the inevitable question: how will these European endeavours affect American interests? How will they become incorporated into the then-emerging and now well-established Atlantic system of security and defence? Or will it get out of this system through a thorough, cautious and not-so-cautious series of decisions and actions? These unsolved questions worried America half a century ago and do so even more intensely now.

There are, however, states of affairs that have changed dramatically. The European Union of today is quantitatively and (more so) qualitatively different from the Europe of the first post-WW2 decade, most especially in economic terms. Europe has become an “economic giant” equal to the United States.

Another factor, this time external, which went through a great historical change: the former Soviet Union. Russia’s attitude to European efforts at security and defence is diametrically opposite to that of the Soviet Union.

Finally, there are dimensions, which have partly remained the same and have partly been transformed, sometimes rather radically. It relates to French and other national interests and nationalisms, the French ones being the major reason for the collapse of early undertakings in the 1950s. The French National Assembly rejected the Treaty on the European Defence Community in 1954 when it was presented for ratification, mostly for nationalistic considerations, but partly out of fear of rearming Germany. The idea of a European Political Community as the logical result of the collapse of the EDC quietly faded away.

After that, the ship of European integration definitely and decisively took course in the direction of economics. European security and defence were forgotten for decades, though quickly absorbed by a rapidly emerging NATO.

For the sake of fairness, it is necessary to recognise that there were periodic attempts to return to a “European identity” in foreign policy, security and defence. Since 1970, Europe has developed a rather modest European Political Cooperation (EPC), a system of mutual consultations, exchange of information and attempts to develop common positions. Since 1993, it has grown into the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Within this framework joint actions of the Union began. There were high hopes for the Western European Union (WEU), created on the basis of an amorphous Brussels treaty in 1948. But the WEU has quickly disappeared into NATO’s shadow. It partly revived in the 1980's and its membership (including members, associated members, observers and associated partners) grew to twenty-eight by the end of the century. But it never became a formidable defence organisation.

Some European nations-notably France and Germany-started creating their own common fighting forces. The two nations established a Franco-German brigade in 1988, which grew eventually into the Eurocorps of 50,000 troops from five European nations.3 France, Italy, Portugal and Spain created two multinational formations, land (Eurofor) and naval (Euromarfor). Britain, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands established their own multi-national division, and Britain and the Netherlands, a marine formation. By the end of the 1990s multilateral units (divisions, brigades, regiments and even battalions) started growing like mushrooms. But this process was in substance spontaneous, and thus palliative.

Extremely important has been the slow but steady legal foundation of the second, political “pillar” of the European Union which was established in 1990. The Single European Act (1987) expressed in general form a wish to develop cooperation in European security. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) worked out fundamentals of a common foreign and security policy.

A major step forward was made by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was developed before the Saint-Malo summit, but came into force afterwards on 1 May 1999. It distinctly formulated major provisions for European defence policy as well as three fundamental spheres of its implementation: (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks, (2) peacekeeping tasks and (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In fact, the treaty basically absorbed the well-known Petersberg tasks, envisaged by the WEU Declaration and adopted in Petersberg in 1992. Still, for the European Union, official adoption of the ESDP tasks was a great step forward. Next, the Amsterdam treaty contained a decision to include the WEU in the European Union, ending the long-standing controversy within the EU. Finally, an important organisational decision was taken to create the post of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana, former secretary general of NATO, became the first High Representative, a kind of EU foreign and defence minister.

Building ESDP

The reaction of practically all EU members to the Saint-Malo appeal was a convincing indication of how ripe the longing was for a European common defence. Though almost half a decade has passed since this appeal, the discussion on roots and reasons of ESDP still continues, both in Europe and outside. Therefore, it is worthwhile to join this discussion.

The foremost reason for doing so seems to be outstanding economic growth of the European Union, whose leaders, by the end of the century, realised that the EU plays an inadequate political and security role in the contemporary world. This apprehension was growing slowly but steadily and by the time of transition from the 20th to the 21st century, it was being continuously expressed. The European Commission, in its program “Shaping the New Europe” devoted to strategic objectives for the years 2000-2005, expresses it quite eloquently: “Our objective must be to make Europe a global actor, with a political weight commensurate with our economic strength-a player capable of speaking with a strong voice and of making a difference in the conduct of world affairs.” The economic strength of the European Union, therefore, became the decisive factor for increasing the role of the Union in policies, security and defence.

Secondly, changes that took place outside the European Union also had an impact, e.g. the dramatic global transformations that took place after the end of the Cold War. The disciplining role of the Cold War, which more closely bound the Atlantic Alliance, started to diminish. Doubts about the protecting role of the United States started to grow. In such a situation it was only natural for Europeans to start worrying about their own security and defence.

Thirdly, during most of the post-WW2 period, problems regarding autonomous and independent common defence were part of a continuous internal struggle within the European Union. The most active advocates of European defence were France (during Charles de Gaulle) and Germany. Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg also lent support. The main opponent was always Great Britain. Due to special relations with the US Britain demanded that all European efforts be strictly within the NATO framework. Britain´s usual ally was the Netherlands. Italy was vacillating between two extremes. New members Austria, Sweden and Finland were partly neutral, partly leaning towards the Franco-German position.

By the end of the 20th / beginning of the 21st century the situation had changed. London turned rather sharply towards France and Germany (thus Saint-Malo), as did the Netherlands and even more so, Italy. The result was what may be called a “defence consensus” within the EU.

Lastly, a new factor was introduced by the so-called “conflicts of a new generation,” the Balkans. They have shown very vividly the inadequacy of EU capabilities in dealing with such crises. The international force UNPROFOR, created by the UN in 1992 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisted of contingents from about 40 countries, almost half European, including eight European members of NATO. But still, the US played the dominant military role. Several NATO members participated in aerial attacks against Yugoslavia in 1999, but the decisive role was played by new American high technology, which the European members of NATO lacked. The Kosovo crisis led to a kind of frustration, even humiliation in European political circles.

It seems that these factors pushed the leaders of major European countries, including Britain, toward reconsideration of the spontaneous neglect of purely European dimensions of security and defence that had prevailed for so many years. This set of circumstances had been accumulating for a long time and erupted very quickly in the post-Cold War atmosphere. The EU Cologne summit (3-4 June 1999) formulated the first cycle of decisions on the basis of a set of German proposals eagerly supported by other members of the Union. It stressed: “We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage.” Though German ideas contained preliminary elements of most major decisions, the main emphasis was put on proposing principal organisational superstructures of the future EU defence establishment. The proposed system looked quite harmonious and logical. In addition, the European Council created the Political and Security Committee (PSC), composed of national representatives at the senior/ ambassadorial level. In the case of military crisis management, the PSC will exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation. At a lower, more pragmatic level was another new structure: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military delegates, which provides direction to Military Staff. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the third new structure, provides military expertise, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The duties of the Military Staff include performing early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning for Petersberg tasks, and identification of European national and multinational forces. The Secretary General / High Representative (SG/HR) is actively participating in this process.

An important set of initial decisions was adopted at the Helsinki summit of the European Union (10-11 December 1999). The essence of the Helsinki decisions could be expressed in two words: “headline goal.” The members of the EU set this goal for themselves: by 2003 they should be able to rapidly deploy within 60 days and sustain forces up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or fifty to sixty thousand personnel), supported by air and naval elements. These forces should be militarily selfsustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other elements. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.

The appeal for the headline goal met an energetic response from most members of the EU and even from some countries not belonging to the Union. On 20 November 2000, the EU carried on a Capabilities Commitment Conference that recorded pledges by Member States of the forces they were ready to commit for the rapid reaction capabilities outlined in the headline goal. The contributions were registered in a special “Force Catalogue.” The total number of commitments exceeded 100,000 persons plus approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. Major commitments were made by Germany (13,500 troops, 93 fighter aircraft, 20 ships), the United Kingdom (12,500 troops, 72 aircraft, 18 ships), France (12,000 troops, 75 aircraft, 15 ships) and Italy (12,000 troops, 47 aircraft, 19 ships).

From the very beginning of building ESDP, since the Cologne and Helsinki summits, the European Union paid particular attention to what was initially called 'non-military crisis management tools': civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring etc. The EU summit in Santa Maria de Feira (Portugal), or in short, simply Feira, made an important decision to develop the capability, by 2003, to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management. Prior to Feira, one more ESDP structure was established: the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The first EU police mission (EUPM), a force of about 540 officers and experts, will replace from 1 January 2003 the current United Nations police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A subject of EU special attention is where Europe traditionally lags behind the US: military high technology. European States recognise that they should undertake new efforts in such areas as C3 (command, control, communications), intelligence and the whole set of information technologies, all kinds of electronic attack capabilities, and strategic mobility (heavy long distance transport aircraft, air-refuelling tankers etc.). Even the most advanced members of the EU (France, Great Britain, Germany) do not possess all that is necessary.

Several EU summits stressed the extreme importance of determined efforts aimed at overcoming existing deficiencies. The Nice session of the European Council (7-10 December 2000), which adopted the most comprehensive report on achievements and problems of common security and defence policy, paid particular attention to what is called in the EU “collective capability goals.” They include multiple projects in such areas as: strategic mobility to deliver forces to the field of operations; headquarters to command and control forces and associated information and communication systems; means of providing forces with intelligence information and resources for search and rescue in operational conditions; means of defence against ground-to-ground missiles; precision weapons.” It is obvious that these and other new military capabilities cannot be developed quickly and will demand continuous determined efforts.

The resoluteness of the EU is characterised by the consistency with which it is solving newly emerging problems. The European Council in Goteborg, Sweden adopted a detailed policy of joint exercises of rapid reaction forces and Union structures for future collective actions in crisis situations. The first large-scale staff crisis-management exercise (CME 02) was carried on simultaneously in all the capitals of the EU members from 22 - 29 May 2002. The exercise was preceded by an historic decision at the EU summit in Laeken (Belgium, 14-15 December 2001) adopting a Declaration on the operational capability of the common European security and defence policy. It stated that “the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations… Such a capability to act results from the substantial progress that has been accomplished since the European Councils in Cologne and Helsinki.” Thus the EU is steadily forging ahead.

It would be wrong to assume that this process is developing smoothly, without difficulties and sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other elements. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.

The appeal for the headline goal met an energetic response from most members of the EU and even from some countries not belonging to the Union. On 20 November 2000, the EU carried on a Capabilities Commitment Conference that recorded pledges by Member States of the forces they were ready to commit for the rapid reaction capabilities outlined in the headline goal. The contributions were registered in a special “Force Catalogue.” The total number of commitments exceeded 100,000 persons plus approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. Major commitments were made by Germany (13,500 troops, 93 fighter aircraft, 20 ships), the United Kingdom (12,500 troops, 72 aircraft, 18 ships), France (12,000 troops, 75 aircraft, 15 ships) and Italy (12,000 troops, 47 aircraft, 19 ships).

From the very beginning of building ESDP, since the Cologne and Helsinki summits, the European Union paid particular attention to what was initially called 'non-military crisis management tools': civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring etc. The EU summit in Santa Maria de Feira (Portugal), or in short, simply Feira, made an important decision to develop the capability, by 2003, to provide up to 5000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management. Prior to Feira, one more ESDP structure was established: the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The first EU police mission (EUPM), a force of about 540 officers and experts, will replace from 1 January 2003 the current United Nations police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A subject of EU special attention is where Europe traditionally lags behind the US: military high technology. European States recognise that they should undertake new efforts in such areas as C3 (command, control, communications), intelligence and the whole set of information technologies, all kinds of electronic attack capabilities, and strategic mobility (heavy long distance transport aircraft, air-refuelling tankers etc.). Even the most advanced members of the EU (France, Great Britain, Germany) do not possess all that is necessary.

Several EU summits stressed the extreme importance of determined efforts aimed at overcoming existing deficiencies. The Nice session of the European Council (7-10 December 2000), which adopted the most comprehensive report on achievements and problems of common security and defence policy, paid particular attention to what is called in the EU “collective capability goals.” They include multiple projects in such areas as: strategic mobility to deliver forces to the field of operations; headquarters to command and control forces and associated information and communication systems; means of providing forces with intelligence information and resources for search and rescue in operational conditions; means of defence against ground-to-ground missiles; precision weapons.” It is obvious that these and other new military capabilities cannot be developed quickly and will demand continuous determined efforts.

The resoluteness of the EU is characterised by the consistency with which it is solving newly emerging problems. The European Council in Goteborg, Sweden adopted a detailed policy of joint exercises of rapid reaction forces and Union structures for future collective actions in crisis situations. The first large-scale staff crisis-management exercise (CME 02) was carried on simultaneously in all the capitals of the EU members from 22 - 29 May 2002. The exercise was preceded by an historic decision at the EU summit in Laeken (Belgium, 14-15 December 2001) adopting a Declaration on the operational capability of the common European security and defence policy. It stated that “the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations… Such a capability to act results from the substantial progress that has been accomplished since the European Councils in Cologne and Helsinki.” Thus the EU is steadily forging ahead.

It would be wrong to assume that this process is developing smoothly, without difficulties and problems. There are more than enough roadblocks in everyday practice. Serious complications arose in the sphere of merging the Western European Union into the EU. Several tough problems have also emerged between the new European endeavour and NATO. Officially, the EU and NATO, as well as the US are proclaiming mutual understanding and a desire to cooperate. But pragmatic aspects of this cooperation are developing very uneasily. It demands a lot of interaction and cooperation between the EU members themselves, in particular major actors of ESDP.

European Triangle

The key role in the formation of ESDP is played by three countries: France, Germany and Britain. The latter, after abandoning its multi-year resistance to European autonomous defence, became the major author of the surprise brought to Europe and the world in Saint-Malo.

Quite legitimate is the question: how final was this turn? In a sense, it did not change many fundamentals of British foreign policy. But at the same time, this particular change was formed by concrete historical conditions of contemporary Europe, still being discussed and analysed by foreign policy experts.

Sometimes in this discussion, too much stress is put on the decision taken by the Labour government of Tony Blair. True, Labour politicians have traditionally been supporters of European integration. Though Great Britain joined the EC in 1973 under the Conservative government of Edward Heath, it was carried out with very strong Labour support amongst the public and Parliament. The favourable position of Labour politicians played a certain role in British actions. The Conservatives (Margaret Thatcher in particular) fiercely attacked Saint-Malo and ESDP.

Still, this general background does not explain the major reasons for Britain’s sharp turn from opposition to support. A more substantial basis for this turn was created by the failure of Europe to unilaterally solve the Balkan crises. By many accounts, this single-handedly changed the attitudes of Toni Blair’s inner circle. Many Western observers also point to domestic reasons for the revaluation of interrelationships between the United Kingdom and the European Union. There was growing concern that too much stress on a separatist position in the EU, along with special relations with the United States, may weaken Britain's status in Europe and, as a result, maybe even in the world. The Blair government began to feel a diminishing role for Britain in Europe, in particular when London decided not to join the Euro zone.

The reasons, which may be called European, look quite formidable. First of all, there is the steady and successful advance of European integration. Then there was the strengthening role of France and Germany, both of whom were pushing Britain into a secondary position. And finally, London was increasingly realising that the development of the common European foreign, security and defence policy was gaining speed to such an extent that it was becoming inevitable. London faced an alternative: to continue to be outside of this process and lose, or to join it. After years of opposition, the joining process had to be spectacular. And it was.

The new European realities couldn’t avoid influencing the attitude of the United States. Their alternative was to continue to encourage the United Kingdom, through the system of special relations, to oppose the European integration in foreign policy, security and defence. Or, to the contrary, to smoothen the rigid attitude and comply with the British initiative, having in mind that a more reliable ally is better within this inevitable process than outside of it. It would be a gross oversimplification to interpret this US position as an attempt to make the UK a kind of “Trojan horse” within the emerging European defence system. The situation is much more complicated and nuanced. It is based more on give-and-take approaches by both sides of the equation, being at the same time an additional factor influencing the British decision. Thus the question, how long-term was the British turn, still stands without final reply. But for the sake of fairness, it is necessary to stress that Britain continues to play an active initiating role in ESDP.

The Saint-Malo summit, and decisions that followed it, not only created the need for explanations but also raised some important questions. One of them: why was Germany not involved directly in Saint-Malo? It would be only natural that Germany be a party to it after solid decades of activities and initiatives in the “Franco-German engine” in the field of common European security. There may be several reasons for a certain caution and discretion by the German political elite. It could take into account a growing concern, at least in some European capitals, about the unusually large weight of unified Germany on the European economic and political scene. If only to pay proper attention to such a concern, it would be logical to leave the first major step to the only two West European nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Under such circumstances Berlin would lose practically nothing by stepping slightly aside, especially under conditions of very close contact with Paris in the days preceding and following the Saint-Malo summit.

A certain US role is assumed. Some American circles tend to look at Germany as their major ally in Europe. Under such conditions, it made no sense for Berlin to demonstratively ignore this Washington tendency. Most important, it was clear to all that to build a European defence disregarding Germany would be impossible. It was confirmed later by this simple fact: in all the calculations of future European forces, the German contingent was always considered to be the largest. Properly recognising the role of the British and German angles of the “major triangle” it is then necessary to return to the role of France as the principal driving force of European integration in security and defence. The French position and policy was not devoid of pragmatism and, at times, of readiness to compromise. In the post-Cold War period and in particular, in the second half of the 1990s, France had undertaken steps to smoothen its relations with NATO. But in what may be called the Saint-Malo process, France proved again and definitely its role as the major driving force in constructing autonomous European security and defence. France once again proved she was the leader.

This leadership is not without problems. Primarily, France has been dealing with a contradiction between European integrationalism and French national interests for many decades. Ideal for France was a situation in which it could guide the integration without prejudice to its national (even nationalist) interests. Paris succeeded in creating such a situation for decades, with Germany complying with French primacy and with Britain first out, and later in a secondary role. But such a state of affairs couldn’t continue indefinitely. Sooner or later it had to end. Germany became more powerful after unification. Great Britain was becoming more and more active. By the end of the century, France had to comply with Atlantism and NATO to a certain extent. But it did counterbalance this compliance with new dynamic efforts in the process of European integration and in particular, in common security and defence of the European Union. Thus, Paris once again reasserted itself as the most determined upholder of new European endeavours.

Thus, the formation of ESDP is not an ideal, but the whole process of European integration was never ideal. Nevertheless, it has always overcome obstacles and contradictions and moved from one success to another.

Washington’s Vacillations

While analysing the quickly developing independent actions of the EU, it should not be forgotten that the fundamental basis of US-EU and NATO-EU relations, which continue to develop under American leadership, is formed by a multiple system of the Atlantic alliance, civil society, political and military unity. The Kosovo crisis once again demonstrated the power of common interests and goals, and the durability and binding strength of NATO discipline. At the official level both NATO and the EU eagerly demonstrate this concord. The Washington NATO summit, devoted to the 50th anniversary of the organisation (23-24 April 1999), praised the EU determination to develop autonomous military capabilities, which may act independently of the Alliance. The harmony stops when both sides, while trying to avoid damaging basic transatlantic relations, pursue, nevertheless, their own national or group interests, often contradicting each other. Such interests manifest themselves quite evidently in EU actions.

Washington treated initial EU attempts to develop common security and defence policy rather condescendingly. The US political elite remembered well the decades of EU existence without such a policy and did not take these first European efforts seriously. But when the construction of ESDP became steady and dynamic, Washington's approach began to change. First, it became more complicated and the declaratory support began fading away.

The US position developed its own dynamism based on several components. First of all, it was a concern that ESDP should not harm the integrity of NATO and, above all, the firmness of American leadership in the organisation. The question of possible damage that may be inflicted by further development of ESDP was not idle. Another part of this worry was an uncertainty on how far Europe could go.

One more problem for the United States: how could this European process be squeezed into the NATO framework, to subordinate it to the NATO command and control system, and to what extent. Washington attempts, and will continue to attempt, to achieve this goal with the clear understanding that it is very difficult but not completely impossible. But the efforts will continue in the hope of at least partial success.

Finally, the new European policy could contain some promise of achieving the old American dream of forcing European members of NATO to increase their contribution to the Alliance's defence budget. But a paradox of present European plans is that most EU members want to build up the new rapid deployment forces simultaneously with public efforts to reduce national defence expenditures, or at least not increase them. At the same time, it is absolutely unclear whether Washington would be happy if the enlarged European military expenses go to the autonomous (or even worse, to independent) European forces.

In principle the EU envisages a complicated system of interaction with NATO and accordingly carries on negotiations with it. The authors of ESDP have two operational formats in mind: one completely independent, the other utilising NATO assets, structures and capabilities. Naturally, the second type of action should, by definition, be more sophisticated and modern. The EU is striving for an arrangement that would provide them with NATO assets, not on a case-by-case authorisation, but automatically upon EU request.

The reality was disappointing. NATO agreed to provide its assets only on a case-by-case basis. The negative impact of this setback should not be overestimated. European nations have their own well-developed military capabilities that allow them to undertake various kinds of operations without resorting to NATO assets.

The EU is determined to get the automatic formula, often called “Berlin plus.” It was part of the pre-ESDP EU-NATO understanding achieved in the mid-90s, first, at the Berlin Atlantic Council and later, and in more detail, at the Brussels Atlantic Council (thus “plus”). “Berlin-plus” relates to the use of NATO assets by the WEU. There is a disagreement between Europeans and Americans on the essence of the “Berlin plus” model: Europeans feel that it precludes the spontaneous use of NATO capabilities by European forces; Americans interpret "Berlin plus" as an obligation for conditional use. The controversy continues and only the future can provide answers.

After 11 September 2001

The European response to the tragedy of 11 September 2001 was strong and comprehensive. The reaction was not only emotional (14 September 2001, for the first time in the history of the EU, was proclaimed an official day of mourning in the Union) but very practical, and most importantly, swift. The very next day after the horrible terrorist attack in New York and Washington the EU Council of Ministers held an emergency meeting that adopted a decision to develop specific measures to fight international terrorism. It was followed by the extraordinary EU summit on 21 September 2001 which approved a detailed Plan of Action-the basis for anti-terrorist operations in the beginning of the 21st century.

From the start, EU leaders took the reasonable decision to activate ESDP as one of the major tools in the struggle against terrorism. The summit stressed that “by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational at the earliest opportunity the Union will be most effective.”

The European rapid reaction forces were made operational 3 month later, two years before the previously accepted year 2003. There were proposals to expand the list of three Petersberg tasks by adding “task 4”-antiterrorist activity. But it was finally decided that such an activity is an important element of all the three Petersberg tasks.

While developing cooperation with the US, Russia, other countries in the campaign against international terrorism and the EU did not turn into a blind US follower. All major European powers, except Britain, reacted negatively to President Bush’s plans to attack Iraq. Thus, the EU continues to elaborately develop its own autonomous course.

ESDP - Russia: Problems and Prospects

Vigorous European effort in common security and defence was as surprising for Russian policy-makers, experts and the public, as for many others, inside as well as outside Europe. They grew accustomed to decades of slow evolution in EU political cooperation and common foreign and security policy. The first natural impulse in Moscow was to wait and see how realistic this new European endeavour was, to give it a balanced appraisal taking into consideration all assets and liabilities, to work out approaches to it based on Russia’s national interests.

At first glance, the new European effort contained both pluses and minuses. On the one hand the Petersberg tasks (peacekeeping etc.) inspired confidence. In particular because the EU, from the onset, stressed that in ESDP "the Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."10 It continued to emphasise its decision to act in cooperation with the UN and the OSCE and established working contacts with the Secretary General of the United Nations, who submitted proposals for closer cooperation between the EU and the UN.

On the other hand, caution was breeding doubt. The new military organisation was rising in Europe. Its leaders were proclaiming it would increase the capabilities of NATO. The NATO Washington summit of 1999 praised this new phenomenon. The active participation of some NATO and EU members in the bombing attacks against Yugoslavia was complicating the state of affairs.

The decisive factor was and is the general state of relations between the EU and Russia, which constantly demonstrates an identity and conformity of views and positions on a majority of present international issues. It was visibly confirmed when Russia made a clear distinction between its attitude toward NATO- and EU enlargement.

In principle the idea of Russian-EU cooperation in the sphere of international and European security has a long history. The Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, adopted by the EU Cologne summit in June 1999, proposed strategic partnership with Russia on problems of security and co-operation in conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution, including future Russian participation in missions within the range of the Petersberg tasks. Russia's response in the form of its own Strategy of developing relations with the European Union, adopted by the end of 1999, was detailed and constructive.

Finally, a real breakthrough in this evolving cooperation was achieved at the Russia-EU summit in Paris on 30 October 2000. The summit adopted a Joint Declaration on strengthening the dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues in Europe. The Joint Declaration covered the most important areas of security and defence. The EU and Russia decided to: establish (at the appropriate level and in the appropriate format) specific consultations on security and defence issues; develop strategic dialogue on security issues with implications for the Russian Federation and the European Union; widen the field of expert-level consultations on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation; promote cooperation in operational crisis management. In particular, both sides decided to examine the modalities of the Russian Federation's contribution to EU crisis management operations.

As the next EU-Russia summit (Moscow, 17 May 2000) stressed in a joint statement, both have made questions of foreign policy and security a permanent element on the agenda in political dialogue. This is true at all levels of diplomatic exchange, including the highest. Further summits (Brussels, 3 October 2001 and Moscow, 29 May 2002) confirmed this decision. They undertook a number of practical actions, among them: increasing exchange of information on security and defence matters; establishing close ties between the EU Political and Security Committee and Military Staff and corresponding Russian bodies; special monthly meetings in these fields; possibilities of Russia's participation in the future EU police force in Bosnia and Herzegovina; possible EU use of Russian long-haul air transportation, etc.

The EU Summit in Seville, Spain (21-22 June 2002) adopted a special resolution on joint EU-Russia operations in the event of a crisis.

The maturity of EU-Russian political-military relations was vividly demonstrated by joint actions against international terrorism undertaken after 11 September 2001. On the basis of a common decision adopted at the highest political level on 3 October 2001, a series of joint EU-Russia actions are taking place: radical upgrading of exchange of extremely sensitive information; dialogues between anti-terrorist experts; customs cooperation to combat terrorism; money laundering and drug trafficking; resolute actions to block any source of financing for terrorist organisations, and several others.

The political and even legal base for effective Russia-EU cooperation in the area of security and defence was successfully created. Now both sides are able to quietly, steadily and fundamentally move ahead. It will naturally take time now that the European Union and Russia are ready to proceed.

A significant role in this process will be played by the mechanism for enhanced cooperation. It seems that one possible way is the creation of a joint body on security and defence, perhaps something like the Russia - NATO joint organisations. It is quite possible that if such a Russia - EU organ existed during the Kosovo crisis, it could continue to operate at a time when Russia - NATO relations were broken. The lines of communication between Russia and the European Union could possibly be saved and, through them, communications with the West in general.

Prof Dr Vitali Zhurkin, Honorary Director, Institute for European Studies, Moscow, Russian Federation