This contribution reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not claim to express an official position of the International Institute for Peace (IIP). IIP is undertaking currently a global study on “De-escalation of Ethno-Political Con-flicts,”including the conflict between Israel and Arab Palestinians.

All who were in hope of a development towards peace between Israel and Palestinians since the Oslo peace process are shocked by what is happening.

Unequal partners met in Oslo. This fact was hidden to the public behind what was called the "breakthrough"-the first time representatives of the State of Israel met a purely Palestinian delegation under the leadership of Arafat, whom Israel had previously called a terrorist. In fact, many Israeli citizens who met Arafat before the breakthrough were sentenced by Israeli courts for just this reason.

What could both sides have brought to the negotiating table, besides Norwegian hospitality and good services? After Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War Arafat demonstrated solidarity with Saddam Hussein. The so-called moderate Arab states, especially Kuwait, where shocked. The Palestinian community in Kuwait expressed much sympathy to Iraq's occupation; therefore, they were expelled from Kuwait after successful intervention by the US army and their allies. One member of the Kuwaiti ruling family, Sheik Fahed Al Ahmed Al Sabah, commander of the Kuwaiti unit fighting with Palestinians against Israel in the 1973 war, was killed by Iraqis.

The PLO lost a great part of its financial support from Arab countries and therefore seemed to be

sentenced to a complete turn in its policy vis-à-vis Israel, USA and Europe. Another reason might have been the fact that the fundamentalist movement in the occupied territories, especially the Gaza Strip, gained increasing influence among younger Palestinians, particularly those educated at the Islamic University in Gaza City. There are numerous rumours that the fundamentalistic Hamas was initially supported by Israeli services to split the power of the PLO.

Meanwhile, Israel qualified the rise of Hamas as an increasing threat to security. Further increase of Hamas' influence would run contrary to the interests of Israel.

The late prime minister Rabin, originally a Hawk but due to his former military functions one of the best informed leading politicians in Israel, at this point supported the policy of his former labour party opponent, Perez. They were both trying to sell the new policy concerning occupied territories: "Peace for Land."

These endeavours were strongly fought by a substantial majority of Likud; on the other hand, they were supported by the majority of the population, connected with their hope to profit from peace with the Palestinians by gaining security and by refusing military services directed against the civilian population. For example, ordinary Israeli citizens serving in the army and their relatives could not understand why the bones of Palestinians boys must be broken for the offence of throwing stones at Israeli soldiers.

No doubt there was also support by the Clinton administration, which intervened several times against the ongoing settlement policy of Israel in the territories, especially in the West Bank. The US was also adamant that their policy of coalition with moderate Arab states not disturb US military installations, which are essential for safeguarding their control over the Gulf area.

If one looks at the results of the Oslo Accord without going into much detail, the Palestinian representatives gained mainly one significant advantage: the exiled leadership was permitted to come home. Despite radicalism since the 1960's-despite fighting, despite using terrorism as a means and despite the very human kind of fighting during the first Intifada-there has always been some partition between those left at home and those acting from their exiled positions. For a man like Arafat living for decades in permanent flight from being captured or assassinated it was the last chance to come home to Gaza. Even people who devoted their whole life to the national cause have the very human yearning for normal life. To have a home is the desire of Israelis and many Jews the world over, not only a native country, but also a place of refuge in case of need. Among Palestinians there is a highly developed longing for a home on one's own land, not so much a home in the sense of an ethnically-based nation but based on the terra firma on which they were used to living. This combines with a strong sense of familial loyalty characteristic of Palestinian culture. These traditions are obviously stronger than what was achieved in Oslo and what has been left over for further negotiations.

The greatest omission in Oslo was the implementation of third party control over settlement issues, as well as ensuing rounds of negotiations and step-by-step solutions in forthcoming years.

The introduction of the Oslo Accord in the West Bank and in the Gaza was a big event for self-valuation of the Palestinian people. The picture of Arafat for many decades was their national brand; now they saw him physically. But at the same time, two cultures met each other: many of Arafat's administrators and soldiers had never seen Palestinia before because they were born in refugee camps somewhere in Lebanon or Syria. Their experiences were completely different from those living under Israeli occupation since 1967, inhabitants as well as refugees. To manage a liberation organization is quite different from administrating an autonomous authority. Nevertheless, Arafat and other leaders acted like they were used to it during their time in exile. The consequence was increasing criticism, mainly from those used to more democratic decision-making and usage of funds. This secular approach was accompanied by criticism from fundamentalists.

Investments, especially from Europe, produced a sort of hope and prosperity among a part of the Palestinian population, but the majority remained poor and was confronted with corruption. Economic development remained completely under Israeli control; for import and export business every Palestinian needed an Israeli partner to speed up the exchange of goods and the work of Israeli customers. But what was far more important to Palestinians was the continuation of Israeli settlement policy. The spirit of the Oslo Accord seemed to erode in Israel. New Israeli settlements in the West Bank did not indicate that Israel was really willing to hand over land for peace. Space was reserved for both settlements and a new system of roads and security zones to bring settlers as safely as possible to their work in Israel-all this on account of Palestinians. At the same time, hopes to earn money by working in Israel vanished as Israeli security policy protected their people against violent attacks by replacing the Palestinian work force with Asians.

The assassination of Rabin and subsequent election of Netanyahu were indications that Israel was going back to the dream of Erez Israel. That meant automatically another interpretation of Palestinian autonomy. This autonomy was no longer the starting point for an independent Palestinian state, but for homeland status similar to South Africa's struggle, but in a much more closely settled territory.

The last hope seemed to be Barak, but then his parliamentary basis narrowed. The majority in the Knesset no longer supported the policy of “Peace for Land.” Barak’s offer in Camp David seemed to be generous. If it had been made in Oslo it would have been accepted; but after all the broken promises since Oslo the Palestinian leadership was obviously not in the internal position to accept that just part of occupied territories and Gaza be the basis for the Palestinian state.

If weak leaders come together at this moment it would be nearly impossible to find a solution, even under the benevolent guidance of an outgoing President of the United States. What the Oslo process is teaching us is that any new attempt to solve the Palestinian question must include a complete settlement of problems for both sides: territory, repatriation of settlers, at least corridor solution between West Bank and Gaza, detailed security and border cooperation, recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians including the theoretical right of return, compensation, concretely dated steps for the free flow of goods and services between the states, concrete joint border administration in the Jordan valley, concrete joint water administration, and the settlement of Jerusalem on the basis of the Oslo Accord.

The provocation of Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mountain, albeit not the only reason, ignited the second Intifada. Patience of the Palestinian people expired. Hamas' size and reputation among Palestinians has dramatically increased. One of the reasons is that they have developed a kind of social network for the poor, and the majority of Palestinians are poor. Their radicalism and organized terrorism stimulated quite obviously a remarkable part of Fathah to join this course. Their attempt should demonstrate that there is no peace for Israelis as long as a Palestinian state is not established. But they achieved the contrary as it has been in any similar case before. The large majority of Israelis assembled behind their hardliners when they felt threatened by Palestinian suicide fighters. The Israeli peace camp suffered especially from this development.

Unfortunately, the US has accepted in practice a concept of Erez Israel. President Bush promised to support a statehood of the Palestinians. At the same time, after considerations with Sharon he announced that he would not accept the present leadership if re-elected. Would he accept the Hamas leadership? If one supports a Palestinian state and is a democrat then she or he cannot ask for re-elections alone, but also the right of Palestinian people to elect the leadership they want. To force a people to accept a non-elected leader means asking them to accept limited sovereignty. Such a Palestine would not be an independent state, but a Middle East Bantustan.

A second conclusion derives for any future attempt to bring peace to Palestine: no party can decide upon the leadership of the other party.

There may be longer and more detailed analyses about the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, but apart from the already mentioned precondition for a new attempt at negotiations, the most important question is how to reach the conditions for a new round of peace talks. For this purpose one has to identify the roots of the claims of both peoples.

Israel reverses to ancient history, going back 3000 years to the empire of King David and Salomon. By doing this, they have created the impression that Jews were living there since that time only to have been expelled later from the territory. As a matter of fact, the Hebrews came from Mesopotamia and subjugated other peoples as was common at that time. Only after approximately 100 years were they themselves suppressed or subjugated under a third party. With the same legitimation Syria or Egypt could ask for at least a part of the territories concerned.

The singular quality of Israel's claims is the religious component. Moses 2, 3/2 and 24/5 entitle Jews to their claims, supplying also instructions on how to achieve them.

The most important and unique motivation for a Jewish state were the violent persecutions (pogroms) of Jews in former czarist Russia, Poland and other east European states. Other motivations have included the rejection of Jewish endeavours at assimilation all over Europe, growing nationalism such as the unification of the German states, claims for ethnically-based nation-states among practically all nationalities in the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with the deliberate ostracising of Zionism etc. These were in fact a starting point of the present conflict over Palestine, not the question of who lived there 4000, 3000 or 2000 years ago. One should note that in the discussion of where to locate a Zionist state, East Africa was also under consideration.

On the other hand, the Arab claim for Palestine based only on the Arabic character of the territory is as misguided as the Jewish claim, and for practically the same reason. The descendents of many peoples living in Palestine for thousands of years are the present Palestinians. It is therefore senseless to think in ethnic and nationalistic terms, as in Europe, where Palestine is concerned.

One should remember the very controversial debate between former Austrian chancellor Kreisky, heir of a Jewish family, and Zionist representatives of the Israeli Labour Party. He rejected the claim that all Jews are one people. For him it was too close to the racial doctrine of the National Socialists of Germany. He argued that many Jewish communities, in Russia for example, were not descendents of Jews coming from Palestina who were forced to live in the diaspora. In other words, they are Jews by religion but not Semites. At the same time Kreisky tried-and finally succeeded-to convince the Palestinian leadership to not only accept the right of Israel to exist as a state, but also to take into account that Israel is a nation-state and a people of destiny.

For all these reasons another precondition for the successful revival of peace talks appears to be indispensable: any Palestinian leadership must guarantee territorial security to Israelis against Palestinian threats, as far as the state of Palestinians has the means to ensure this guarantee. Otherwise there can be no majority in Israel for peace with the Palestinians. Israel, in turn, would have to stop all clandestine activities in Palestine and stop all counter attacks. These items seem to be the core and the key for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Minute preparations and a step-by-step agenda for implementation have to be prepared. The low level of mutual confidence makes these items paramount.

What has happened up to the beginning of July 2002, unfortunately, is the contrary. Israel closed the office of the Palestinian autonomous authority in Jerusalem and the responsible Minister of Security in Israel Uzi Landau bluntly rectified this step as the closing of an "illegal" representation. If this is the signal of a new and more severe course of Israel's policy in the occupied territories the consequences will be much more serious then closing just one office: it means to deny that a Palestinian autonomous authority exists anymore. Apart from the legal qualification, the intention is to destroy the last fundaments of confidence. The so-called illegal representation was headed originally by Feisal Husseini. He was unofficial mayor of eastern Jerusalem and descendent of one of the leading families of Palestine. Husseini spent many years in Israel's detention prisons. After his death the President of the Arabic Al-Quds University, Sari Nusseibeh, filled this function. His father was Minister of Defence during the Jordanian rule in the West Bank until 1967. Nusseibeh is, like Husseini before him, an exponent of using only nonviolent means to serve the Palestinian cause. Nusseibeh and his British born wife Lucy published an appeal on March 20th to their Palestinian countrymen to pursue nonviolent conflict resolution. It is everyone's obligation to refer to this text because it makes visible the nonsense of present Israeli policy.

In order to prevent any kind of censorship I decided to publish the whole text that was written and published just before the outbreak of Israel's warfare on Palestinians and the wave of suicide bombing of young, dispirited and misguided Palestinians in Israel.

“More Effective Force” is a new six-part TV series. It shows that nonviolent, political struggle has constituted one of the most effective and inventive forms of change in the 20th century. Local Palestinian TV stations will begin showing this series on 21st March. Each episode highlights a different perspective from various parts of the world: toppling the white minority rule in South Africa; achievements of the movement against racial discrimination in the US south in the 1960s; non-violent resistance of the Nazi occupation of Denmark in the 1940s; solidarity strikes that ended Soviet hegemony over Poland; the restoration of democracy in Chile; and of course, the events in India led and inspired by Mahatma Gandhi culminating in the liberation of India from British colonial occupation at a time when the British Empire was the main superpower. All these experiences represent success stories of nonviolent methods of confronting conflict.

Every episode includes live scenes of real events and interviews with people who took part in them. But what mostly distinguishes this series is the clarity and force of the message, whether from the aspect of the peaceful means or the peaceful ends. On the basis of Gandhi's philosophy, the man who pioneered the methodical organization of nonviolence and its most energetic use, the message is as clear as the sun. The thrust of nonviolent struggle for the achievement of just political objectives, especially when used against a bestial, barbaric force and against great imbalances of power, is not only extremely effective in the achievement of these objectives but it is often simply faster. Perhaps this method is sufficient to achieve these objectives.

This message, which gains special importance today in relation to the Palestinian people, must give hope as well as provide a new strategy for a peaceful people. This people is primarily unarmed, occupied by a state that is predominantly military in nature with full nuclear capability and with an arsenal of advanced conventional weapons. Recent events have shown clearly two things: on one hand, Palestinians have proved a high degree of readiness, determination, and courage, yet Israel’s military superiority has prevented them from achieving their political objectives; on the other hand, Israelis will never be able to score decisive political victory over the Palestinians despite their overwhelming military superiority. Moreover, resorting to the strategy of nonviolence by a primarily unarmed people can directly deprive the Israelis of the advantage of being the stronger military power. It will redefine the rules of the game in the battlefield and enable the unarmed Palestinians labouring under the burden of occupation to take the initiative and launch an attack that cannot be repulsed. Its thrust gains momentum like a rolling snowball through every individual amongst this people, for it leans on their just rights. And the columns of the Israeli army and its informational clout would stand hapless in front of it.

The TV series recalls examples of conflicts in which nonviolent strategies proved to be more able than many military powers and political authorities that were mighty at the time. And consequently, they are more able and effective than violence as a means of affecting political change. The series shows how one nonviolent activity with a defined, prominent objective, such as Gandhi's march to the sea to bring salt in defiance of the tax on salt, can inspire the creativity of the whole nation living under the yoke of tyranny and injustice, and mobilise and move it. Also it reveals a facet no less important, albeit less widespread and less understood: that non-violence requires a great degree of courage, discipline, determination, and a clear vision and strategy, not acquiescence, surrender, and cowardly avoidance of confrontation. On the contrary, it requires confrontation because it is a popular battle using nonviolent means. In addition, this battle cannot be on the other side's abstention from using violence against the first one. Nonviolence is based on the assumption that the opponent will use violence and all forms of bestial practices, and on violence rebounding on the interest of the opponent. This is why nonviolence requires a great deal of organization and courage, a high degree of commitment that even entails sacrificing the self and highly advanced tactics. Borrowing an example from language, we may compare violence to screaming and yelling with the intention of making one heard in a certain crisis, while nonviolence could be compared to a clear, logical message. And while screaming and yelling can be heard, most of the time it is not understood. The listener stops listening or paying attention after a while. Against this, if the message is clear it is easily understood. It is also effective in stimulating activity, action, winning sympathy or achieving the desired objective.

The methods of nonviolent struggle are not strange to the Palestinian people. Palestinians, men and women alike, used these methods during many periods of their history, including against the Ottoman rule. And the 1987 Intifada in particular constituted a very advanced form of nonviolent struggle. It was a popular revolution in the full sense of the word. It had a clear political objective and unified strategy: replacing the octopus of Israeli occupation with popular mechanisms of Palestinian authority in all facets of life, from commerce to education.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Palestinians have become instructors in the arts of resistance. For Palestinians, their struggle is one of the few brilliant examples in the history of struggles for national independence. It is a struggle that by all criteria will certainly bear the fruit of victory and grant the Palestinian people real freedom and independence. But in the context of an occupying force with a high degree of military organization that does not hesitate to use force against unarmed civilians the real power of the sons of the Palestinian people rests in themselves and the justness of their cause. The concept of justice is the energy that drives all nonviolent movements. It drives whole peoples. The justness of the Palestinian cause is not disputed. The biggest proof of the commitment to this cause, which even reached the level of sacrifice, has been confirmed in a painful way through the numbers of martyrs of all ages all over the country.

There is now a need for finding the key within the possible strategies of nonviolence. Through this key the Palestinian people could be mobilized despite the policies of closure and dismembering pursued by Israel, and at the same time reaches the conscience and humanity of the external world, including the Israeli people and policymakers in the United States. Nonviolence itself is a battle of information like any other battle, so that the Israeli Government finds itself in a vortex. This vortex must give the Israeli Government the choice of losing the support and sympathy of most of the external world, especially the West-support and sympathy it cannot ignore-or reaching a just, possibly permanent, agreement with the Palestinians. Since it is not sufficient that the justness of this cause is glaringly evident and that the Palestinians are visibly the victims, it is essential to make sure that the justness of this cause is not distorted by deceitful information.

As this TV series shows, the key to starting any effective nonviolent activity is finding the confrontation point that must be a shameful, objectionable matter in no uncertain terms. This series may help us find this key and go back to our moral power in order to win this inequitable military struggle.”

On 12th July I read an article in the International Herald Tribune under the headline “The Wrong Target.” Identifying myself with its content to a large extent I would like to conclude with an except from it because it shows that nonviolent thought has not been completely killed off in the US in the aftermath of September 11th:

“Sari Nusseibeh seems an odd focus for Israeli anger. Nusseibeh, the Palestinian Authority’s representative in Jerusalem, is the leading voice of moderation within mainstream Palestinian politics. In a breathtakingly wrongheaded move, Israel shut down his office at Al Quds University on Tuesday. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon should limit the damage by quickly reversing the decision.

Last month President George W. Bush exhorted Palestinians to turn to “new and different” Palestinian leaders “not compromised by terror.” Nusseibeh, a scholarly man descended from an elite Jerusalem family, would occupy a prominent place on any list of such leaders. He has repeatedly taken constructive positions, sometimes in opposition to Yasser Arafat.

Last year Nusseibeh courageously urged fellow Palestinians to drop their insistence on a right of return by refugees to their former homes in Israel. An agreement by Israelis and Palestinians to coexist as two neighbouring states, he argued, means accepting that the future state of Palestine, and not Israel, will be the homeland for all Palestinians. Last month he helped organise a petition by Palestinian intellectuals calling suicide bombing against Israeli civilians counterproductive and urging that they be halted. Stronger words of condemnation would have been welcome, but the petition marked an important breakthrough. Most recently he has been trying to build a coalition of Israeli and Palestinian peace activists. At the time of the raid on his office Nusseibeh was meeting with some of these Israelis in Greece to work out a joint peace proposal.

The Palestinian Authority appointed Nusseibeh, who is the president of Al Quds University, as the Jerusalem representative last year. The title carries considerable prestige but no decision-making power within the Palestinian Authority. With Israel now virtually at war with the authority, Nusseibeh´s office became a tempting target.

Under the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israel can approve or disapprove any Palestinian Authority office or activities in Jerusalem. The Sharon government decided to invoke this power to close Nusseibeh’s office on the grounds that he was using it to carry out his representative functions. At the moment when Israel should be embracing moderate Palestinians, this narrow reading of the tattered Oslo agreement is self-defeating.”

But unfortunately Sharon’s record teaches that for him moderates seem to be more dangerous than suicide bombs.

Erwin Lanc, Federal Minister ret., President of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, Austria