In Unifying Europe the Balkans are Still the Achilles heel

In the last decade of changes in the international system the Balkans were consistently labelled with the term ‘South-Eastern Europe.’ That is in compliance with the well-known European prospects for the notorious region. The Yugoslav-crisis prompted the transition to not be as simple as desired. After the Bosnian and Kosovo crises came the troubles in Macedonia. Any possible complications in that small and young state will prove to be very dangerous for stability in the region as a whole and for its future. It could have serious implications on relations among other neighbouring countries and would be a great challenge for the international community.

The clashes that started in March 2001 near the border between FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia are confirming the predictions of Rudyard Kipling's writings. In his novel "The Light That Failed" one of his war correspondents always opens his conversation with the news that there would be trouble in the Balkans in the spring.  The great novelist gives the impression that in this region troubles come every spring. This spring we have the tension in Macedonia, i.e. the Albanian national problem is acquiring new dimensions, Montenegro is taking decisive steps towards independence from Yugoslavia, Bosnian Croats are aspiring for a stronger identity, Turkey is in financial difficulties and former Bulgarian king Simeon II, who has founded a political movement to run in general parliamentary elections in June 2001, has captured the public interest, in a strange turn of events. He is the only royal heir, at least in the former Eastern bloc, to run in election polls.  Simeon II started a political movement just on the eve of the elections. Its statute will have problems to comply with the law on political parties. At the same time there is some suspicion that the refusal of the court to register the movement has not been a politically neutral one.  The disappointments from existing political parties are providing wide support for Simeon II.  Preventing his participation in the elections may cause troubles in Bulgaria, which until now was a relatively calm place in the Balkans. To imagine the whole picture of the region one should not underestimate the fact that the former communists in Romania won the parliamentary and presidential elections and the communist party in Moldova took an overwhelming majority in the parliament. Regardless of the fact that Milosevic lost the Yugoslav presidential elections in October 2000 the optimistic expectations for more European developments in the region appeared not well founded. In spite of the international community's efforts in recent years to transform the Balkans into a foreseeable integral part of Europe, they continue to generate unpredictable developments. Obviously the Balkans are still the Balkans.

The season changes and the beautiful Balkan springs may have something to do with the tradition to intensify political activities in the region. After the long severe winters, when many ideas and intentions have been discussed in the pubs and taverns, the time comes for action. But that is not all. The reasons for the notorious fame of the Balkans are rather complex and lie deep in their geographic position, in their history, in their economic backwardness, in their ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and, of course, in their role in the contemporary international system. The spring vitality only favours politically grounded developments.

The Balkan states and South-Eastern Europe occupy a special place in the structure of international relations. In that part of Europe, for centuries there has been "friction" between European and Asian civilizations, between different religions and cultures. Though this region has established connections amongst the different states, conflicts have also occurred between them as well. The region's role as a "fortress against Asia" has brought to it an almost permanent instability. In the new history, during the Napoleonic wars, the region acquires the name "Balkans," after the German geographer Johan August Zeune invented the term 'Balkan Peninsula' in 1808 to replace European Turkey. Gradually it received a special context and became a term for characterizing complex problems in international relations.

The specific conditions for the ongoing development in this region have created a number of characteristics, which distinguish the region from the rest of Europe. Geographically, the region is crossed by high mountains encircling small valleys, which, however, are interconnected with each other and with the rest of the world by interesting corridors along the river valleys.

The ethnic and religious differences have contributed to the mosaic demographic structure of the region. In some of the ethnic groups of the region (mainly connected with Islam) the demographic growth is much higher than the economic one, which creates imminent socially and politically explosive problems.

Major historical epochs in the Balkans have not coincided with historical epochs in the rest of Europe. Non-European events and factors have separated the Balkans from the common route of European history. That is why Balkan people never experienced such economic accelerations of the historical processes such as the Renaissance in the 15th century, the Reformation in the 16th century, the national revolutions in the 17th and 18th century and the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century. Because of those facts the region was doomed to experience slow and grueling economic and political modernization.

While in Western Europe the nations, as modern social organisms, emerged in existing states, the Balkans states gained their independence on the basis of nations, formed in the empires existing at that time. Due to several reasons the Balkan nations managed to acquire statehood at different times. For some ethnic entities in the region it appeared impossible to organize their independent state. From there sprung the notorious ‘Balkan nationalism’ and the endless border disputes.

In its historical development the Balkans establish themselves as a region plagued with religious and social conflicts and political instability. The inherent weakness of Balkan countries has made them seek help from foreign powers. For the Great Powers, the region becomes an arena of conflicts, tension and struggle for influence.

One of the reasons for the conflicts in this region is its low level of economic development. Natural and human resources are limited. The average age of the population in most Balkan countries grows progressively. The urbanization of large territories and migration deteriorate even more the economic problems of the countries. Agriculture remains under-developed. The markets of those countries have a very small capacity. Investments, if any, are targeted to branches of light industry, which usually provide high and quick return. For a long time South Eastern Europe remained outside the perimeter of the discussion about international economic policy. In order to get out of the vicious circle in which their development currently is, Balkan countries need to cooperate and need responsively organized economic and political aid from outside.

The overcoming of block separation changed the structural role of this region in the international system. A new process, based on the triumph of the liberal-democratic model of social progress, developed. The region became an arena of conflict between the interests of the newly established centres of power, determining the characteristics of the new world order. The situation of Balkan countries is one that allows those centres to exert influence over other parts of the world, especially over Eurasian regions.

With the end of the Cold War began a radical restructuring of the international system, which inevitably exerted influence on the ongoing regional and worldwide processes. The last decade of the 20th Century will remain in history as a turnover in the developments in the changing entities and in the relations among them. Currently there is a process of overcoming the diatomic character of the international community and the ideological, economic and military-political gap connected with it. In contrast to other turning points in the history of international relations, now the change came without an outbreak of a global military conflict. In the frameworks of the bipolar system the two opposing sides had mobilized enormous potentials, which, without being put into action, made specific marks on current events. They forced mankind to rethink the whole absurdity of the military-strategic situation that contains the possibility for self-destruction.

The main form of denial of the absurdity of divided Europe is the realization of the idea of regional and continental co-operation. The idea of a united Europe has never been so close to its practical application. A step to that end is the regional co-operation in the historically differentiated parts of the continent. The European Union is the most impressive example. A kind of regional co-operation is organized within the European Free Trade Association. Efforts are made to organize co-operation in Central Europe, in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, on the Balkans. Stimulating the efforts in that direction is the position of the European Union, putting as a precondition to candidates for membership for starting talks on that the active participation in other regional forms of cooperation.

The efforts to organize new societies have to comply with the notion of a new world order. Until now, the international system was based on the national idea; states were their basic elements. Those states, large or small, powerful or weak, were considered equal by international law. Now we are witnessing an abandonment of this concept. The idea of sovereign equality is jeopardized by the understanding that the attitude to every state should be formed on the basis of its commitments to values such as democracy, market economy and human rights. There is something new in the international atmosphere. The new world order perceives any deviation from the mentioned values as threats to security and general well-being. This opens the floodgates for actions against regimes, responsible for establishing domestic order in contradiction to the rules, pretending to be new international norms. They are presented as accepted by "the international community."  The need for action on its behalf is measured by the humanitarian costs of failing to influence such regimes. The case of Yugoslavia and the regime of Milosevic give good confirmation of such conclusions, although it is difficult to consider, for example, China and Russia as members of this international community. But still Russia is something quite different from the Soviet Union. Today's China is also different from the time of Mao's rule. Today, signs of partnership can be witnessed in relations between former rivals.

But in those conditions the countries in transition in South Eastern Europe are in some kind of hesitation as to which of the favourite models of social development to follow: the EU or the US. Still the dirigisme in the EU seems incompatible with the market euphoria in Eastern Europe. It causes unexpected difficulties in establishing new legislation and institutions. After accepting the EU as their priority partner these countries had to realize how different the US and EU models of social development actually were. It appears that they came to this understanding very late. The outcome for South Eastern Europe will depend on the interests and the policy of those important factors in the international system and what the place of the region in their priorities will be.

On the one hand, the transition to democracy and market-orientated economy dominates the region. There is a total orientation of all countries from that part of the continent towards integration in the European political, economic and security structures.  On the other hand, some events in the Balkans still manifest the notorious characteristics acquired in the early beginning of the last century—political crises, turmoil, military conflicts, involvement of non-regional powers.  The clash between the twin tendencies of Europeanisation and re-Balkanisation of the region produces dramatic events.

The development of the processes in this region is a function both of the local factors and the policy of the main, out-of-the-region, powers, which have interests in this part of the world. It is probable that they will find a common formula for the division of labour in this difficult region. The USA can remain a European power through a strongly-felt American presence in the Balkans, accepted by the European Union and Russia. The crisis in Yugoslavia set the path for development. The European Union is not very enthusiastic about the acceptance of the countries from this turbulent region as new full members. Russia, losing a great deal of influence in a region in which the country has traditionally been interested, would be pleased if the European Union and the USA allow her to preserve its role in this concentration of interests. This outlines the perspective of South-Eastern Europe becoming an arena for compromises between the interests of the main actors on which Europe's security depends. This means that security and co-operation in this part of the continent will be a result of the correlation of powers among the three centres. And the ratio is destined to be changing permanently. The redistribution of the roles among the global powers changing their functions in the international system will have fateful effects on the people from South-Eastern Europe. It is already discerned that the foreign-policy initiatives for South-Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the region around the Black Sea synthesize in themselves the new moments in the attitude of the European Union, USA and Russia. The direction of NATO and EU enlargements and how they will cover South Eastern Europe will depend on that.  Absolute support for this conclusion gives the discussion on the US's initiatives for the development of cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and recently, in connection with the Kosovo crisis, on the so-called Stability Pact.

The processes taking place in the Balkans after the end of the Cold War create conditions for the synthesis of new formulae of compromise between the two Atlantic power-centres with a specific role for Russia. The events make the USA prone to strengthen their presence, including military build up in South-Eastern Europe, as a counterbalance to the weakening reasons for US military presence in Western and Central Europe. Meanwhile, the US’s engagement with the responsibilities of changing the notorious fame of the Balkans gives chance to the European Union to set itself apart from the difficult problems in the region, which can cause an unpredictable effect on its ambition to develop as an absolutely new entity in the international system.

The intention of the new US administration to withdraw the American forces from South-Eastern Europe provides conditions for new developments. It might engage the EU with a new role in the region. The peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo is kept by foreign military presence.  In case of US withdrawal the EU will have to increase its military functions. That might change the Russian attitude towards EU enlargement. Now Russia is against NATO's enlargement in the South Eastern direction, but it never declared a negative position towards accession of Balkan countries to the EU. Changing the roles of the USA and the EU in the region may change Russia's position on EU enlargement with all the consequences for the prospects for EU membership of Balkan countries.

Because of this division of labour between the USA and the European Union, the efforts of the countries from South-Eastern Europe to strengthen the foreign guarantees for their security will oscillate between the attracting force fields of the two power-centres. The new conditions can give the countries from the region unspecified place and role in the new system of international relations. This tendency can set them apart from the European and Atlantic structures. This can be unacceptable for the choice already made by the countries from the South-Eastern Europe, but it is at least an option for reconciliation of the interests of USA, EU and Russia. If the political class, overloaded with historical responsibility for the destiny of their people, does not navigate well, considering the new tendencies in the restructuring of the international system then the region may find itself, for one more time, a victim of the compromises in the "great politics."

The most important factors in the contemporary international system are demonstrating concern on the developments in South-Eastern Europe. They are doing that on the basis of specific interests, but strangely enough, the events in the Balkans are not causing much difference among the Great Powers, while stressing on their conflicting opinions on other neuralgic issues. Russia has given its support for the changes in Yugoslavia and shows no regret for the fall of Milosevic. The Russians have established good cooperation with NATO in their peacekeeping mission. In the Contact Group for Yugoslavia common messages without serious difficulties are elaborated. A distinct example is the meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states in April 2001. In Paris they have demonstrated a common position on the key problem in the region—non-violability of the borders. Being so united, the Great Powers have missed the opportunity to draw the due lessons from the many occasions in the region and to reach better understanding of the Balkan problems. The USA managed to impose their biased approach to the developments in former Yugoslavia as a basis for concerted actions. But it prevented revealing the real problems in the region.

The international community failed to analyse the reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia. Doing so, it allowed dubious and questionable solutions of the problems arising from the split of the federation. Particularly disastrous was the recognition of the internal borders, drawn by Tito to provide the Serbian domination, as international borders of the newly proclaimed independent states. On the ruins of the 'state of three nations', as the Serb-Croat-Slovenian kingdom was called at the Paris peace conference in 1919, in the early 90-s of the last century five new states have emerged and there are others, willing to do the same (to name Montenegro and Kosovo). The Dayton Agreement has brought peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is based on the presence of international peacekeeping military forces. This fragile state is a kind of protectorate and there is a little prospect for its existence without international intervention.

A complex mixture of contradicting realities and myths brought the Kosovo problem also to the stage of acute international crisis. Kosovo became good occasion for letting the public opinion get a better understanding of the radical changes which had taken place in the international system. In the most obvious way the new right to intervene in a sovereign country, where internal violence was breaking the new values, was applied. In response to the need for stopping the ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav province, which earlier had proclaimed itself independent republic, NATO undertook a military operation against Yugoslavia in the form of air attacks. It was an unprecedented action and that is why politicians, military experts and academics will deal with it long time ahead. One has to bare in mind the discussions on how successful was the NATO operation, supported by many other countries, including all neighbours of Yugoslavia, and many international institutions. Still some lessons can be drawn from the events, related to the Kosovo crisis.

1. Preventive diplomacy, based on good knowledge of the problem and strong political will, is needed. Intervention may be undertaken only after all other means had been exhausted.

2. Equal and unbiased treatment of the conflicting parties is a must. The Paris negotiations had the potential for compromise, but the inadequate perceptions of the realities prevented it.

3. Trapping of victimization of the minority must be prevented. The Kosovo problem was internationalised prematurely and it gave some advantages to the separatists (not only in Kosovo, but also in Montenegro and Voivodina). The NATO's military intervention gave hope to all kinds of minorities in the region that their problems could be solved by force.

4. Any humanitarian intervention should adhere to the principles of international law. For the time being it is dangerous to neglect the UN Charter.

5. The Kosovo crisis proved that any intervention in single country or region in defense of the new values should not be unilateral action, even of mighty structures like NATO. The only way to overcome suspicions for pursuit of selfish interests in such case is building a multi-state coalition with mandate from widely recognized international institution. The initial attempt of NATO to neglect the United Nations failed, because there was no alternative to legitimate the action.

6. One should not expect that the regional co-operation should be fully subordinated to the interests of global powers. Regional co-operation is possible only when it meets the interests of the involved countries.

7. Regional co-operation must not be organized against powers with declared interests in the region. The nervousness in the Russian policy in the Balkans came as a reaction to NATO's disregard to its vision for the future of the region. The regional co-operation in South-Eastern Europe can't be organized without co-operation among the non-regional powers with important strategic, economic and political interests in that part of Europe.

8. The reluctance of NATO and EU to enlarge in South East direction causes the need to look for an odd solution of the problems in the region. There is some doubt whether establishing protectorates (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia may join the list) is more acceptable than enlargement of structures of security and co-operation.

9. The Kosovo crisis gave evidence that South-Eastern Europe is perceived as a peculiar entity (the Stability Pact, the observations of some politicians come to confirm this perception).  George Soros is advising the Balkan states to unite their efforts and insist on joining the European Union together. Regional co-operation is not giving ground for one and the same attitude towards all co-operating countries in the region from other international structures and states. Considering the Balkans as one entity, without differentiation of the countries in the region, may lead to hampering the process of enlargement of the European Union in that direction. That is unacceptable for some of the countries in the region. They would not agree the Stability Pact to replace their accession to the European Union.

10. Obviously the Yugoslav crisis is far from final resolution. Even after Milosevic stepped down, the uncertainty in Yugoslavia and in the region remains. One could only guess what would follow in case of further disintegration of that federation. Steps of Montenegro and Kosovo in that direction would have unpredictable consequences.

The humanitarian intervention could not establish stability in the region. It put doubts whether the political leadership should trust the military experts.  One of the main reasons for the failure was the fact that the US led intervention favoured unnecessarily the Albanians and it caused further problems on the Balkans. It was proven that the Milosevic's opposition won the elections in spite of the intervention, not because of it. NATO's decided position to let Milosevic step down justified the humanitarian intervention, but "it also justified its alliance with Albanian extremists, who are now trying to do in Macedonia what they did to Serbian authority in Kosovo". 

The international institutions, established to regulate the developments in Kosovo, failed to fullfill their mission. Neither the international administration of the province (UNMIK), nor the military forces (KFOR) managed to establish at least strategic control over it. They proved to be unable to stop the ethnic conflict. The ethnic cleansing continued. The Army for Liberation of Kosovo was preserved as a real power in spite of the attempts to disarm it. In fact a real ethnic cleansing not only of the Serb minority, but also of all others is going on. The international institutions for Kosovo could not impose control over its territory and it became a centre for illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and perhaps many other things.

The highly acclaimed Stability Pact failed to give a small impetus towards regional stabilization. The joint effort of the international community to

1) Secure lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South-Eastern Europe;

2) Foster effective regional co-operation;

3) Give a firm European anchorage to the region, in which the European Union will play a leading role;

4)  Facilitate the objectives of the countries in the region to integrate into Euro Atlantic structures; appeared to be only good intentions, but not effective tools for providing security and prosperity in the region.

The USA gave a sign that they may leave that rather complicated part of Europe. The new president George W. Bush threatened to withdraw American troops from the Balkans. True, it was part of the election rhetoric, but the superpower has to reassess the results of the applied policy in South Eastern Europe and no doubt it will be done. Strange, but at one point NATO warned the Albanian extremists that the Serb army might be allowed to take positions in the buffer zone along the border with Macedonia. What a helplessness of the mighty international community!

Realizing that the things around the Stability Pact are going from bad to worse the EU tried to get to the crux of the matter. It was not difficult to discover that the tension within the pact is generated by the attempt to put into one-mechanism countries with different levels of relationship with EU without differentiating them in its enlargement strategy. The more advanced countries in their accession efforts, like Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, insisted that everyone be assessed on the basis of individual merits and not be dependent on the situation in the region as a whole. Bulgaria even threatened to withdraw from the pact, if it hampers its accession to the EU. All that has prompted the need of more flexibility of EU's concept for South Eastern Europe and brought to life the idea for special attention to the Western Balkans (the former Yugoslav republics, without Slovenia, plus Albania).  The EU proposed to start talks with those countries for reaching Stabilization and Association Agreements. In April 2001 was made the first step in that direction and signed such an agreement with Macedonia. This new format provided opportunities for individual approach to the candidates for full EU-membership. The EU added to that step the attention, paid to all aspiring for membership countries, at the European Council in Nice. The institutional reform of the union was discussed in view of its enlargement. Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania were happy to listen that places in the European Parliament were foreseen for them and their future positions in the other European institutions were discussed. All that gave them more optimistic European prospects. Still, they are well aware that their optimism will need recharging, or all these gestures may feed vain hopes. Witnessing the EU's untrustworthy hesitations to be involved in the Balkan processes, or to stay aside of them, they cannot stay at ease.

The lack of good understanding of the Balkan problems creates serious contradictions in the efforts of the international community to make the region a more secure place. The simple clichés cannot explain the Balkan complexity. It is difficult for the most important factors of the region to understand the essence of Balkan instability—the clashes of the national myths. The mythologies supply the great national ideas of all Balkan nations with enough arguments that let people fight not for solution of social problems, but for national identity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo, in Macedonia the demands are not for human rights, but for collective rights, i.e. for national identity. In Kosovo the slogans were for less Serbia in the province. Now in Skopie one can identify slogans for less Albania in Macedonia. In such an atmosphere it is impossible for any power to impose coexistence of conflicting ethnic groups. To settle such problems, if possible, time is needed for many generations to realize the necessity of mutual respect.

As it was mentioned above, the international community is sticking rigidly to the understanding for inviolability of the existing borders. But these borders were drawn not along the borders of the ethnic and national entities and for many of them they are not acceptable. The nation is purely emotive; "it provides a sense of belonging and community of its members," while the state is political and administrative. In the Balkans the state borders are confined for the "great" nations and at the same time history has made it impossible to have ethnically pure nation-states in this part of Europe.

Now the most acute problem in the region is connected with the Albanian national idea. It is so late that there are no important factors in contemporary world to understand it. Having in mind the firm position of the international community, rejecting any changes of the borders in the region, the only solution is to let the Albanians accept borders, dividing them into communities in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Southern Serbia and Montenegro. In this case it is difficult to expect any success of the international community. It was trapped in the historic plan of Ibrachim Rugova for provoking developments that should lead to establishing an international protectorate over Kosovo as a step towards its independence. Obviously the success of the Albanian national idea at that stage is tempting to be continued in Macedonia. The clashes in Tetovo are causing nothing less than concern in those, who have given support for the Albanian cause. The firm reaction is about to take the heat out of the situation in Macedonia for the time being, but there are doubts whether it would be possible after 10 or 20 years. The demographic trends show that then the ethnic Albanians will be over 50 per cent of the population there.

It would be impossible for the international community to be a policeman in the region for indefinite time. The idea for partial replacement of the present peacekeeping forces with the Balkan multinational military forces would not give the solution. NATO is encouraging the involved in that form of regional cooperation countries to accept engagement in the hottest spot of the conflict—along the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. The prime ministers of Greece and Bulgaria gave signs of support for the idea during their meeting in Thessaloniki in April 2001. Soon after that it was discussed in Skopie by the defense ministers of the four neighbouring to Macedonia countries and high-ranking officials of NATO, OSCE and UN. The Albanian refusal to give its support for involvement of the multinational brigade in that problem led to the need of another meeting of defense ministers, planned for 5 June 2001 in Athens. If the idea for using the Balkan brigade as a regional peacekeeping force appears to be an attempt of NATO to wash the hands and leave the Balkans, it would be a disaster. Then, sooner or later, to the above drawn 10 lessons we will have to add one more:

11. No regional organization should be authorized to intervene in the Balkan conflicts.

In the last decade South-Eastern Europe is gaining features of one of the regions with the most dynamic geopolitical, social and economic changes. They reflect the radical transformations in the international system and give new dimensions to regional problems. At the beginning of the new century the Balkans have the chance to brake with their notorious past and become an integral part of united Europe. But the South Eastern part of the old continent remains the most distant from the dominating trends, shaping new Europe. In spite of their efforts, the people from this region cannot overcome the fact that their countries are far behind in their development from the rest of the continent, which keeps them apart of the modern international structures. And after the end of the cold war the future of South Eastern Europe remains uncertain. In contrast with the triumph of the ideas of Jean Monet in Western Europe, in South Eastern Europe the unsolved national problem brought into being new states. Inevitably they will have to pass a period of seeking recognition in the old-style nationalism, stressing the concept of sovereignty. All that brought the potential danger of again reviving the notorious fame of the region as the most troublesome place. There is no other way to overcome it, but to provide conditions for making it an integral part of united Europe. It is the responsibility of the architects of the new international order to give a European vision and prospects to the Balkans. Otherwise the Balkans will remain the Balkans, threatening Europe with Balkanisation.